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NEW YORK BUSINESS CORPORATION LAW: ARTICLE 5--
CORPORATE FINANCE
MIGUEL A. DE CAPRILES*
T HE topic of corporate finance is generally regarded as one of the two or
three crucial elements in any corporation law, and one on which a good
deal of heated controversy can be generated. It is a subject that brings into
sharp focus basic differences in point of view, from an extreme confidence in
administrative regulation to an equally extreme faith in the "enabling act"
principle of statutory drafting.
The financial provisions of the new Business Corporation Law of New
York cannot be classified at either extreme. In the main they combine features
of the predecessor statute, the Stock Corporation Law, and of the American'
Bar Association's Model Business Corporation Act; 1 but they also reflect the
impact of the laws of California, Delaware, North Carolina, Ohio, Pennsyl-
vania, and perhaps other states, as well as a few original ideas evolved in
the process of attempting to produce a modern, coherent and workable
statute.
Some months ago, one of my students and I undertook to review the
financial provisions of the new law, with particular attention to their sources
and their history during nearly five years of development. 2 My purpose in
this paper is to analyze these financial provisions largely in the light of the
critical commentary they have received in the ten months following their
enactment. Whenever relevant, mention is made of the provisions of the
omnibus amending bill introduced in the legislature in March 19 6 2 .
3
I
CoRuoPRAT SEcmUTIEs
The Business Corporation Law makes two dramatic innovations in the
law governing bonds and shares: one is the authorization for granting voting
rights to bondholders; 4 the other is the achievement of full limitation of liability
* Professor of Law and Associate Dean at New York University School of Law, a
member of the New York Bar, and a research adviser and drafting consultant to the
Joint Legislative Committee to Study Revision of Corporation Laws. The views here
expressed are personal, not official.
1. The American Bar Foundation's three-volume work, The Model Business Cor-
poration Act Annotated (1960) should be a valuable source of information concerning
the probable interpretation of those sections of the new Business Corporation Law of
New York which have been derived from the ABA-ALI Model Bus. Corp. Act (1959
rev. ed.) [hereinafter referred to as Model Act].
2. De Capriles & McAniff, The Financial Provisions of the New (1961) New York
Business Corporation Law, 36 N.Y.U.L. Rev. 1239 (1961).
3. Omnibus amending bill introduced in Senate, March 8, 1962; S. Int. 3774, S. Pr.
4287, 185th Sess., (1962) [referred to hereinafter as omnibus bill). This bill incorporates
a number of amendments proposed in separate bills during January and February, 1962.
4. N.Y. Bus. Corp. Law § 518(b). See Rohrlich, New York's Proposed Business
Corporation Law, 15 Record of N.Y.C.B.A. 309 (1960); Anderson & Lesher, The New
Business Corporation Law, 33 N.Y.S.B.J. 308 (1961).
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for shareholders in public-issue corporations.5 Also new is the authority given
to directors to allocate to surplus a portion of the consideration received for
shares without par value,6 and to issue certificates for fractions of shares.7
The statute expands the power of directors to act without shareholder
approval in the issue of secured and convertible bonds,8 as well as to reduce
stated capital in situations which involve a reversal of action previously taken
by the board.9 Some restrictions are placed on convertible shares.10
Other new provisions are designed to improve the -rules governing sub-
scriptions1 and to facilitate the issue of rights and options to directors and
officers.12 All of these have controversial aspects which will now be examined.
Bonds-The basic idea of granting voting rights to bondholders, derived
from the law of at least three states,13 seems to have some practical merit.
However, the pertinent section provides for the right "to vote in respect of the
affairs and management of the corporation and any other rights which share-
holders may have."' 4 This language seems too broad. The 1962 omnibus bill
would limit these voting rights to the election of directors and other matters
on which shareholders may vote.15
The elimination of shareholder consent, in the absence of an appropriate
certificate provision, for the mortgage or pledge of corporate assets 6 has been
severely criticized.'7 However, the power to give security seems inseparable
from the power to borrow money, which is normally vested in the directors.' 8
With respect to bonds convertible into shares, a corporation is given the
option either to reserve enough unissued shares to satisfy conversion privileges
or to auihorize the directors, by certificate provision, to file amendments in-
creasing the number of authorized shares up to a specified limit to satisfy
conversion privileges. 19 Accordingly, specific shareholder approval is no longer
necessary for the issue of convertible bonds. The logic is this: If there are
enough unissued shares, the directors normally have sole authority to issue
5. N.Y. Bus. Corp. Law § 630. Cf. N.Y Stock Corp. Law § 71.
6. N.Y. Bus. Corp. Law § 506(b). Cf. Model Act § 19.
7. N.Y. Bus. Corp. Law § 509(a). Cf. Model Act § 22.
8. N.Y. Bus. Corp. Law §§ 911, 519. Cf. N.Y. Stock Corp. Law § 16(1).
9. N.Y. Bus. Corp. Law § 516, adapted from Model Act § 63. Cf. N.Y. Stock Corp.
Law § 35(4)(a).
10. N.Y. Bus. Corp. Law § 519(a),(e). Cf. N.Y. Stock Corp. Law § 27.
11. N.Y. Bus. Corp. Law § 503. Cf. Model Act § 16.
12. N.Y. Bus. Corp. Law § 505. Cf. Model Act § 18A.
13. See Cal. Corp. Code § 306; Del. Code Ann. tit. 8, § 221 (1953); Md. Ann. Code
art. 23, § 18(a)(8) (1957).
14. N.Y. Bus. Corp. Law § 518(b).
15. Omnibus Bill § 25.
16. N.Y. Bus. Corp. Law § 911.
17. Kessler, The New York Business Corporation Law, 36 St. John's L. Rev. 1,
25-26 (1961).
18. A combination of the power of the corporation to borrow, etc. (N.Y. Bus. Corp.
Law § 202(7)) and the power of the directors to manage (N.Y. Bus. Corp. Law 701).
19. N.Y. Bus. Corp. Law § 519(d) (2), basically following N.Y. Stock Corp. Law§ 16(2). The omnibus bill in Section 26 would substantially amend the language of this
section to correct an oversight in making similar provision for shares convertible into
other shares, but would not change the provisions governing convertible bonds.
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them, just as they have sole authority to issue non-convertible bonds. Thus,
there is no reason to deprive them of the authority to issue bonds which are
convertible into the same shares that they have sole discretion to issue. If,
on the other hand, there are not enough unissued shares, the approval given
by shareholders to the certificate provision, permitting the filing of amend-
ments in the number of authorized shares up to a specified limit, obviates the
need of further approval for the issue of bonds convertible into such shares.
Shares, Capital and Surplus-In some respects, the most controversial
provision on Corporate Finance in the new statute does not appear in Article 5.
This is the section2" that retains the principle of Section 71 of the Stock Cor-
poration Law for unlimited liability of shareholders for wages and fringe benefits
owed to employees, but limits its application to the ten largest shareholders
of corporations, the shares of which are not listed on the national exchanges
or regularly traded in the over-the-counter market.21
The modernization of the law of New York on the subject of shares with-
out par value follows the Model Act2 It is controversial mostly on the point
whether it is desirable to allow a period of sixty days within which the directors
may decide what portion of the consideration shall be stated capital and what
portion capital surplus.2 3
It may be worth mentioning here that the omnibus amending bill eliminates
the reference to "capital surplus" in this and a related section,2 4 so that the
consideration received by the corporation in excess of the stated capital rep-
resented by par and no-par shares will be assigned simply to "surplus," with-
out further specification.2 5 The reason for the amendment is to remove a
possible inconsistency with a later section26 which, at least by implication,
permits the carrying forward of the .combined "earned surplus" of several
corporations, following a "pooling of interests," even though the legal form
of combination may involve the issue of the shares of a new or surviving old
corporation.27
20. N.Y. Bus. Corp. Law § 630.
21. Although this anachronistic section offends against the theoretical symmetry of
the new Act, there is a good deal of practical justification for it. The problem is that
undercapitalized corporations in certain industries all too frequently go bankrupt suddenly
without paying their wage-earners, who have no effective means of protecting their claims.
The large public issue corporations, on the other hand, are seldom liquidated, and the
normal priorities given to wage-earners are sufficient protection for their claims.
22. Model Act § 19. This replaces the anomalous provision for two kinds of no-par
shares: those with a minimum stated value (Type A) arid those in which the entire con-
sideration is allocated to stated capital (Type B). N.Y. Stock Corp. Law § 12(4).
23. N.Y. Bus. Corp. Law § 506(b).
24. N.Y. Bus. Corp. Law § 102(a)(12) [definition of "stated capital").
25. Omnibus Bill §§ 1, 16.
26. N.Y. Bus. Corp. Law § 517(a) (1) (B).
27. '"or accounting purposes, the distinction between a purchase and a pooling of
interests is to be found in the attendant circumstances rather than in the designation of
the transaction according to its legal form." American Institute of Certified Public Ac-
countants, Accounting Research & Terminology Bulletins (Final ed. 1961), Accounting Re-
search Bull. No. 48, at 21. See Baker, Dividends of Combined Corporations: Some Prob-
lems under Accounting Research Bulletin No. 48, 72 Harv. L. Rev. 494 (1959).
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The introduction of this amendment has caused some alarm among ac-
countants s,2 who fear that its enactment may be construed as approval of a
credit to earned surplus for consideration received in excess of stated capital
when no pooling of interests is involved. The definition of "earned surplus,"
however, would seem to preclude any real possibility of such construction.2 9
The new statutory permission for the issue, at the option of the corpora-
tion, of certificates for fractions of shares30 is another provision derived from
the Model Act. 31 Its language has been criticized because it does not clearly
limit the issue of fractions of shares to the specific situations in which the idea
is useful: transfers requiring the division of whole shares, share "dividends,"
splits or reclassifications, mergers, etc. The fear has been expressed that a
corporation may issue all of its shares originally as fractions3 2 in order to take
advantage of a later section that permits redemption of fractions of shares out
of capital. 33
The new statute permits directors to reduce stated capital without share-
holder approval in three situations: (1) the cancellation of reacquired shares,3 4
which is a reversal of the issue of those shares by the directors; (2) the reduc-
tion of the amount allocated to stated capital out of the consideration received
for shares without par value,35 which is a revision of the allocation made by
the directors at the time of issue of no-par shares; and (3) the transfer back,
from stated capital to surplus, of any amounts previously transferred from
surplus to stated capital by the directors.36 The last two are subject to a
limitation protecting the liquidation preferences of no-par shares and the
par value of other shares.37
Disclosure of these reductions of capital is made directly to the share-
holders,38 rather than by the filing of a pseudo-"amendnent" of the certificate
of incorporation in Albany as provided in the Stock Corporation Law.30
The issue of convertible shares is limited in two respects: There is a
prohibition against "upstream" conversion into securities of higher rank,
40
28. Testimony of Mr. Miles L. Lasser on behalf of the American Institute of Cer-
tified Public Accountants at public hearing in Albany, February 14, 1962.
29. N.Y. Bus. Corp. Law § 102(a)(6) defines earned surplus in terms of retained
earnings; thus, it would not include capital contributed by shareholders in excess of
stated capital. The earned surplus of the surviving corporation in a pooling of interests
represents the combined retained earnings of the component corporations.
30. N.Y. Bus. Corp. Law § 509(a).
31. Model Act § 22.
32. Testimony of Abraham N. Davis, Department of State (Section 19) at public
hearing in Albany, February 14, 1962. The omnibus bill would permit fractions of shares
only "where necessary to effect share transfers, share distributions or reclassifications,
mergers, consolidations or reorganizations . .. ."
33. N.Y. Bus. Corp. Law § 513(b)(1).
34. N.Y. Bus. Corp. Law § 515(b),(d).
35. N.Y. Bus. Corp. Law § 516(a). Cf. N.Y. Bus. Corp. Law § 506(b).
36. N.Y. Bus. Corp. Law § 515(a). Cf. N.Y. Bus. Corp. Law § 506(c).
37. N.Y. Bus. Corp. Law § 516(b).
38. N.Y. Bus. Corp. Law §§ 515(d), 516(c).
39. N.Y. Stock Corp. Law §§ 35, 36. Cf. Model Act § 63.
40. N.Y. Bus. Corp. Law § 519(a). Cf. Model Act § 14(e).
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designed to avoid provisions that would allow a shareholder to move into a
protected position in the event of corporate adversity; and there is a prohibi-
tion against giving the corporation the right to exercise the conversion privi-
lege,41 since this would in effect be a misleading label for a form of redemption.
When shares are converted, the new method of public disclosure of the fact
and effect of conversioni is similar to that followed for capital reduction,43
although the new statute (retaining the policy of the Stock Corporation Law) 44
prohibits reduction of capital upon conversion of shares.4 5
Subscriptions-Among the non-controversial improvements made by the
new act on subscriptions and other matters connected with the issue of shares
are the provisions requiring a writing for enforceable subscriptions, 6 making
pre-incorporation subscriptions irrevocable for three months,47 prescribing that
calls on unpaid subscriptions be uniform as to all shares of the same class or
series,48 and generally clarifying the consideration to be given in payment
for the shares.49
There has been disagreement, however, about the practicability of merg-
ing the Stock Corporation Law's provision for forfeiture of defaulted sub-
scriptions and of previous payments thereon"0 with the Model Act provisions
for other penalties, as defined in the by-laws, and for optional sale of the shares
in the event of forfeiture, 51 without specification as to which rules are applicable
in particular cases. - The omnibus amending bill 52 attempts to resolve this
question through an adaptation of language found in the law of Ohio5 3 and
the Uniform Conditional Sales Act.54
Rights and Options-Under the new act, the rules governing rights and
options to purchase shares differ according to whether such rights are exercis-
41. N.Y. Bus. Corp. Law § 519(a). CL N.Y. Stock Corp. Law § 27 (shares con-
vertible at the option of the holder only).
42. N.Y. Bus. Corp. Law § 519(f). The language of this section does not adequately
coder the situation where shares are converted at frequent intervals during a period of
time. The omnibus bill (Section 26) would remedy this deficiency.
43. N.Y. Bus. Corp. Law § 515(d).
44. N.Y. Stock Corp. Law § 27(4).
45. N.Y. Bus. Corp. Law § 519(c).
46. N.Y. Bus. Corp. Law § 503(b). Cf. N.C. Gen. Stat. § 55-43(b) (1960).
47. N.Y. Bus. Corp. Law § 173(a), adapted from Model Act § 16.
48. N.Y. Bus. Corp. Law § 503(c).
49. N.Y. Bug. Corp. Law § 504. Cf. N.Y. Stock Corp. Law § 69.
50. N.Y. Stock Corp. Law § 68.
51. Model Act § 16.
52. Omnibus bill § 12.
53. Ohio Revised Code § 1701.20(B) (Supp. 1961). Cf. an early Pennsylvania pro-
vision (Pa. Stat. Ann. tit. 15, §§ 132, 1592) superseded in 1933 by Section 604 of the Pa.
Bus. Corp. Law which provides for a lien instead of forfeiture and sale. (Pa. Stat. Ann.
tit. 15, §§ 2852-604).
54. Cf. N.Y. Pers. Prop. Law §§ 60-81-b (Uniform Conditional Sales Act) at § 79(provision for compulsory public resale of repossessed goods if more than fifty per cent
of purchase price has been paid). The omnibus amending bill, however, does not require
a public sale in order to avoid possible complications under the Securities Exchange Act
of 1934 on the question of registration.
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able by directors, officers or employees, or by others; and according to whether
the options are granted pursuant to a plan or not.
Shareholder approval is still required for those options that are granted,
pursuant to a plan or not, to directors, officers or employees. 5 However, the
new statute facilitates this form of incentive compensation in two ways: first,
the right of dissenting shareholders to receive payment for their shares has
been eliminated; 56 and, second, if the shares to which such options pertain are
subject to preemptive rights, approval of the granting of the optitns by a
majority of the shares entitled to exercise preemptive rights is binding upon
the minority.57
Considerable latitude is expressly allowed in the terms and conditions under
which options to directors, officers and employees are granted pursuant to a
plan approved by shareholders, including permission to issue certificates for
partly paid shares (not otherwise available under the new act)58 and to give
flexible voting and dividend rights to such partly paid shares (not available on
options not issued under a plan).59 The provisions on partly paid shares were
urged by the organized bar on the ground-that, otherwise, confusion could
result under employee share-purchase plans heretofore adopted in the state.00
It should be noted, however, that the new provisions are probably broader on
voting, dividend and liquidation rights of partly paid shares than permitted
by the Stock Corporation Law,61 and that there is no requirement that the
amount still due appear plainly on any certificate issued for partly paid shares. 2
There has been additional pressure from the organized bar for a "grandfather
clause" on the validity of existing plans, for abandonment of distinctions based
upon whether options are issued to directors, officers or employees pursuant
to a plan, and for a broad grant of authority to directors to adminster stock
option plans after shareholder approval of specified basic terms of such plans,
3
but these views are not reflected in the omnibus amending bill.
55. N.Y. Bus. Corp. Law § 505. Cf. N.Y. Stock Corp. Law § 14.
56. Cf. N.Y. Stock Corp. Law § 14.
57. N.Y. Bus. Corp. Law § 505(d). This is the general approach followed in Cali-
fornia, Cal. Corp. Code § 1108, and Pennsylvania, Pa. Stat. Ann. tit. 15, § 2852-612(1958).
58. N.Y. Bus. Corp. Law § 504(h).
59. N.Y. Bus. Corp. Law § 505(f).
60. Committee on Corporation Law, N.Y. State Bar Ass'n & Committee on Cor-
porate Law, Ass'n of the Bar of the City of New York, Joint Report on Proposed New
York Business Corporation Law, reprinted in 84 Report of New York State Bar Ass'n
§ 107, 115 § 5.04 [hereinafter cited as joint Report of Bar Ass'ns].
61. Under N.Y. Stock Corp. Law § 74, if partly paid shares are properly issued, the
corporation may declare and pay dividends "upon the basis of the amount actually paid
upon the respective shares." It is extremely doubtful that the enactment of Section 14 au-
thorizing installment payments for stock issued to employees, without specific limitations
on dividend rights, was intended to amend Section 74, since the two sections can readily
be reconciled.
62. Cf. N.Y. Pers. Prop. Law §§ 162-185 (Uniform Stock Transfer Act), par-
ticularly § 176 (no lien upon shares in favor of corporation unless the certificate contains
notice of the lien).
63. Testimony of Messrs. Covington Hardee, Sinclair Hatch and Matthew G. Herold,
Jr. at public hearing in Albany, February 14, 1962.
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'I
CASH DIVmENDs
The Business Corporation Law's approach to cash and property dividends64
involves three elements which synthesize relevant provisions of the Stock
Corporation Law and the Model Act:
(1) The principle that no dividend in cash or property may be paid to
the shareholders if the corporation is unable or would thereby become unable
to pay its debts as they mature in the ordinary course of business; 65
(2) The traditional New York view that dividends may be lawfully paid
out of any surplus, including unrealized appreciation of assets,6 6 modified by
a new provision in favor of wasting asset corporations; 67 and
(3) The requirement that shareholders must be notified as to the amount
and source of any dividend which is not paid out of accumulated net profits
or "earned surplus.." 68
The interplay of the three major elements has been the subject of con-
siderable comment since the enactment of the new law and will accordingly
be discussed here before the new wasting assets exception, which has apparently
won general acceptance.
Tke test of equitable solvency-It would seem self-evident that an implied,
if not express, prohibition against the distribution of corporate cash or prop-
erty to shareholders, when the corporation cannot pay its debts as they mature,
should be an absolute condition of the granting of limited liability to share-
holders. As a matter of fact, the test of equitable solvency for lawful dividends
can by itself provide a reasonable measure of protection for short-term cor-
porate creditors,69 while the capital-impairment test will not, without at least
an implied equitable solvency restriction." Nevertheless, the inclusion of an
express provision to this effect in the new law has elicited numerous expressions
of disquietude among the lawyers of New York.7 1
At various times it has been suggested (probably erroneously) that the
express provision changes the law of the state,72 and that equitable insolvency
is a rather uncertain limitation on the legality of dividends as compared, for
64. N.Y. Bus. Corp. Law § 510.
65. Cf. Model Act §§ 40, 41.
66. Cf. N.Y. Stock Corp. Law § 58; Model Act § 40(b).
67. N.Y. Bus. Corp. Law § 510(b).
68. Cf. Model Act § 41 (Distributions from Capital Surplus).
69. Cf. Mass. G. L. c. 156, §§ 35, 37 (1932). See Dodd and Baker, Cases and Mate-
rials on Corporations 945-963 (2d ed. 1951).
70. It is of course possible for a corporation to have an ample surplus and yet be
unable to pay its debts as they mature because it has insufficient "equity" capital or be-
cause its assets are "frozen," ie., not readily convertible into cash. Equitable insolvency
may precipitate legal proceedings by creditors and pressure to liquidate assets at heavy
loss that may lead to bankruptcy.
71. Joint Report of Bar Ass'ns, supra note 60 at 109, § 1.02.
72. Cf. Tierney v. J. C. Dowd § Co, 238 N.Y. 282, 144 N.E. 583 (1924), construing
the equitable solvency provisions of N.Y. Stock Corp. Law § 15 to apply only to in-
debtedness embodied in a formal writing.
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example, with capital impairment.7 3  These views suggest another possible
explanation: that the provision makes lawyers uncomfortable because it seems
to demand a greater familiarity with business operations and financial analysis
on the part of the legal adviser of a corporation than has generally been
deemed necessary in the past.
Actually the express provision serves a dual useful purpose: to warn
directors, who may declare dividends without advice of counsel, against im-
provident action even though the corporation has an accounting surplus;74 and
to remind the lawyer that a business adviser should have a modicum of
elementary financial knowledge.75 Lest there be undue alarm among our
brethren at the bar, I may point out that the basic information for the determi-
nation of current equitable solvency is, as a rule, readily available to corporate
management in the form of weekly, monthly, or quarterly cash projections or
cash budgets."6
The surplus test-At first glance it may appear that the Business Corpora-
tion Law, in permitting dividends out of "surplus," 77 defined as the difference
between "net assets" (i.e., assets minus liabilities) and "stated capital,"7
merely recasts the provision of the Stock Corporation Law that forbids divi-
dends by a corporation "unless the value of its assets remaining" after such
dividends equals the "liabilities including capital." 9 However, it should be
noted that the new statute, following the Model Act, 0 does not mention the
word "value" in connection with the measure of assets, and that this may
import an interesting change in the theoretical basis of computing the amount
available for dividends.
The Stock Corporation Law has been interpreted to mean that the direc-
tors must "make a determination of the value of the assets at each dividend
declaration." 8' This requirement places an undue and unnecessary burden on
73. This view, expressed by lawyers at several public hearings, involves an un-
realistic optimism as to the degree of certainty that may be reached in the computation
of asset figures, which in turn control the amount of surplus. The meaning of equitable
solvency is well settled. See, e.g., Brouwer v. Harback, 9 N.Y. 589, 594-595 (1854). See
also Black, Law Dictionary 938 (4th ed. 1951); 2 Bouvier, Law Dictionary 16-2-1603
(Rawle's ed. 1914), and cases and authorities cited therein. Cf. Kehl, Corporate Divi-
dends 12-13, 33, 37 (1941).
74. N.Y. Legis. Doc. No. 12, Explanatory Memorandum (Appendix C) 63 (1961).
75. The lamentable vacuum in the education of many lawyers and law students can
be filled in a few hours of study, assuming a working knowledge of accounting.
76. Essentially the cash projection shows the payments that have to he made for
various reasons during the period and the sources of funds for such payments, including
collection of receivables and borrowing (short-term or long-term), or additional equity
investment in appropriate instances. The traditional financial statements (balance sheet
and income statement), though relevant at long range, do not usually provide the neces-
sary information on current solvency.
77. N.Y. Bus. Corp. Law § 510(a)(1), to be renumbered § 510(b) upon enactment
of omnibus bill § 20.
78. N.Y. Bus. Corp. Law § 102(a)(9) and (12).
79. N.Y. Stock Corp. Law § 58.
80. Model Act § 2(i).
81. Walter J., in Randall v. Bailey, 23 N.Y.S.2d 173, 184 (Sup. Ct. 1940), aftd
mem., 262 App. Div. 844, 29 N.Y.S.2d 512 (1st Dep't 1941), aff'd, 288 N.Y. 280, 43
N.E.2d 43 (1942).
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directors.5 The intent of the new act is to avoid "any construction that would
require appraisal of assets rather than reliance on ordinary accounting figures
for computations of surplus.. .... 8" This interpretation is confirmed by the
protection afforded directors who rely in good faith upon financial statements.8 4
In modem accounting, the statement of assets, liabilities, capital and surplus,
is subordinated to the orderly, computation of periodic profits and losses. The
"value" of an enterprise is more accurately measured by its ability to produce
income than by the aggregate of conventional "values" assigned to some of its
property holdings.8 5 Without developing the point further, because it would
require more space than is here available, one may suggest that the acceptance
of accounting figures for assets is a drastic (albeit eminently correct) depar-
ture from the standard established by the aforementioned construction of the
Stock Corporation Law.
Yet in practice it seems dear that, except in the most unusual case, the
new law will make no difference in the method of determining the amount of
surplus available for dividends.* It is submitted that directors, under the
Stock Corporation Law, have generally relied upon financial statements and
upon the accountants' figures of assets and surplus. Since the issue does not
appear to have been raised in recent litigation, it may be assumed that the old
act has not precluded the use of the conventional "values" assigned to assets
in the modem balance sheet 86
But what about unrealized appreciation of assets? The new statute
eliminates this figure from the computation of earned surplus; 7 it places no
bar to its inclusion in capital surplus. Since the Business Corporation Law
permits dividends to be paid out of any surplus, there is no apparent change in
the law concerning unrealized appreciation.8 8
It is important, however, to raise a "caveat." Modern accounting does
not favor unrealized appreciation of assets. In the quest for orderly computa-
tion of periodic profits and losses, earnings are assigned to the accounting
period in which revenue is "realized," i.e., converted into cash or equivalent.
A recognition of -unrealized appreciation as "revenue" or "earnings" upsets
this orderly arrangement because it is premature as a matter of timing. Thus,
unrealized appreciation does not belong in earned surplus.8 9 If unrealized
82. Cf. Baker and Cary, Cases and Materials on Corporations (3d ed. unabr. 1959),
text notes at pp. 1211, 1195.
83. N.Y. Legis. Doc. No. 12, Rev. Supp. 9 (1961).
84. N.Y. Bus. Corp. Law § 717.
85. Assets, other than cash and receivables, are keyed to historical costs rather than
estimated market values. Many valuable items, such as favorable executory agreements
(including employment contracts with talented personnel), do not normally appear on the
balance sheet.
86. The old New York law has often been described as applying a "balance sheet"
test for dividends. See, e.g, Baker and Cary, op. cit. supra note 82 at 1196; Lattin and
Jennings, Cases and Materials on Corporations 1102-1105 (3d ed. 1959).
87. N.Y. Bus. Corp. Law § 102(a)(6).
88. N.Y. Legis. Doc. No. 12, App. C, 62 (1961).
89. American Institute of Certified Public Accountants, Restatement and Revision
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appreciation is placed in capital surplus, and capital surplus is available for
dividends, the payment of such dividends may result in a dangerous drain in
the financial capital of the corporation.9" Accounting practice therefore tends
to recognize unrealized appreciation only in unusual situations, such as quasi-
reorganizations. 91 If it is reasonable to expect that, under the new statute,
established accounting and financial usage will be more persuasive to the courts
than it has been in the past, the principle of Randall v. Bailey may well prove
in the future to be applicable to a much smaller number of instances than
the cases have heretofore suggested.92
Whether this is good or bad depends to a large extent upon one's prejudices.
I rather suspect that the affection with which Randall v. Bailey is held in the
hearts of many corporation lawyers is due, not only to the fact that it provided
almost inexhaustible teaching material for Professor Ralph J. Baker, but also
to its ringing declaration of judicial independence from accountants, econo-
mists, investment analysts, business and other laymen in the interpretation
of a statute. 93 On the other hand, Mr. Arthur H. Dean some ten years ago
observed that "Randall v. Bailey has produced no marked change in the dis-
favor with which unrealized appreciation is viewed as a source of dividends."9 4
A reasonable conclusion is that the new act, if it tends to reduce the amount
of dividends paid out of unrealized appreciation of assets (which remains to
be seen), will be in tune with prevailing expert opinion.
Disclosure of sources other than earned surplus-More controversial is the
requirement that disclosure be made to the shareholders when a dividend is
paid from sources other than earned surplus.95 A number of prominent lawyers
have argued that the distinctiofi between earned surplus and other types of
surplus is new to the law of the state, 96 and that there is no reason for
of Accounting Research and Terminology Bulletin (Final ed. 1961) (A.R.B. No. 43)
11, 73.
90. For this reason, a number of statutes permit only share dividends out of re-
valuation surplus; e.g. Ill. Bus. Corp. Act § 41(c), Mich. Gen. Corp. Act § 480.22, Ohio
Rev. Code § 1701A3(B).
91. American Institute of Certified Public Accountants, op. cit. supra note 89 (A.R.B.
No. 43) at 47.
92. For example, it is probable that "developed goodwill" would not be acceptable,
notwithstanding Hayman v. Morris, 26 N.Y.S.2d 754 (Sup. Ct. 1941).
93. Walter, J., supra note 81 at 179:
: " . the question is not one of sound economics, or of what is sound businessjudgment or financial policy or of proper accounting practice, or even what the
law ought to be.
94. Dean, Provision for Capital Exhaustion under Changing Price Levels, 65 Harv.
L. Rev. 1339, 1343, n. 11 (1952).
95. N.Y. Bus. Corp. Law § 510(a) (2), to be renumbered § 510(c) upon enactment
of § 20 of the omnibus bill. "Earned surplus" is defined substantially in accord with
standard accounting usage. N.Y. Bus. Corp. Law § 102 (a) (6).
96. Note, however, that for many years (1890-1923) the New York corporation law
permitted dividends only out of "surplus profits," a concept closer to earned surplus than
to capital surplus. This provision first appeared in the N.Y. Stock Corp. Law of 1890
(L. 1890, ch. 564, § 23) and was eliminated by the N.Y. Stock Corp. Law of 1923 (L.
1923, ch. 787). At the time, capital surplus did not have the magnitude or frequency
that it has today.
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imposing a substantial burden on New York corporations in the absence of
cogent evidence that there is something wrong with the present statute.9 7
The enactment of the disclosure requirement is traceable to "the wide-
spread practice of creating large surpluses by the issue of shares with nominal
par or stated values."9 8 Especially in connection with common shares, the
spread between par value and issue price in recent years has tended to be very
large. 9 If dividends may be paid out of the capital surplus so created, with-
out appropriate disclosure of the source, the corporation law becomes a natural
incubator for more or less genteel Ponzi-type swindles.' 00 The obvious radical
corrective would be to prohibit altogether any dividends from sources other
than earned surplus. From an accounting and financial point of view, this is
the logical remedy because the premium paid upon the issue of shares, regard-
less of its legal label, is part of the capital investment of the shareholders.' 0 '
Much can be said in favor of the imposition of statutory restrictions on distribu-
tions out of capital surplus (e.g., permitting payment of dividends on preferred
shares out of capital surplus only if there is no earned surplus), rather than
the disclosure requirement, on the ground that disclosure is seldom beneficial
to the average shareholder.'2 Nevertheless, the scheme of the new act seems
to provide a sensible balance of interests.103 On the one hand it retains the
flexibility of the old law with respect to the legality of dividends and other
distributions of cash or property out of any surplus. On the other hand it
tends to frustrate flagrant fraud upon the shareholder, since he must be given
fair warning if his dividend check does not represent what he would normally
expect it to be-i.e., a distribution of earnings-but is instead a return of
his own or somebody else's capital.'0 4
I On the technical side, criticism of the new act has been addressed to the
difficulties and uncertainties involved in making the required distinction between
earned surplus and capital surplus. It is noteworthy that none of the ac-
countants who have testified at the various public hearings have envisaged any
97. Testimony of bar association representatives at public hearing in Albany, Feb-
ruary 14, 1962. The disclosure provisions were deemed to be "paternalistic."
98. N.Y. Legis. Doc. No. 12, App. C., 63 (1961).
99. It is a rare occurrence today for common shares to be issued at or near their
par value. A random sample of par-value .common stocks advertised in the New York
Times, taken on Monday, February 19 (pp. 36-37) and Friday, February 23 (p. 47),
1962, shows two issues on the first day with identical 100 par values offered at $3.25
and $3.50 per share; on the second day, a conservative issue of $5 par value at $16-y/
per share, and a somewhat bolder issue of 10 par value at $6 per share.'
100. Cf. Kehl, Corporate Dividends 69, n. 219 (1941) on Associated Gas & Electric
Company case. For a more critical view, see Kessler, The New York Business Corporation
Law, 36 St. John's L. Rev. 1, 28-33 (1061).
101. American Institute of Certified Public Accountants, op. cit. supra note 27
(A.T.B. No. 1, 5 para. 66) at 29.
102. Baker and Cary, op. cit. supra note 82 at 1295-1307.
103. As between corporation and shareholder. With respect to creditors, the dwindling
protection afforded by nominal par or stated value of shares underscores the importance
of the equitable solvency limitation on dividends.-
104. It is possible that this information, therefore, may have significance from the
viewpoint of taxation of such dividend.
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difficulty in complying with this phase of the law. For them, making the distinc-
tion between earned and capital surplus is standard practice,105 regardless of
whether or not it is required by law. Since most New York enterprises are
likely to use the services of professionally trained accountants, the number of
corporations which still mix earned and capital surplus into a single account
is probably very small. For such cases, however, the new act provides a simple
method of compliance. 0 6
With respect to uncertainty, it has been pointed out that there are dif-
ferences of professional opinion among accountants concerning the effect of
specific transactions upon earned surplus; and some doubts have been ex-
pressed as to whether corporations will be able to determine the amount of
earned surplus at the time of declaring dividends, if this should occur in the
middle of an accounting period.10 7 Without going into detail on these issues,
or on the broader problem posed by the elements of judgment and estimate
that are inherent in the accounting process, one may simply note that the
new statute contains two exonerating provisions: first, it permits a statement
of the approximate effect of the dividend on the surplus accounts if the exact
amounts. are not determinable; 0 8 and second, it imposes liability only when
there has been a failure of good-faith compliance with the notice provisions.1°9
The liability for failure of compliance with this and similar notice provi-
sions is based on tort and is placed deliberately upon the corporation rather
than upon directors or officers." 0 The basis of action is the loss sustained by
the shareholder -in consequence thereof; corporate liability is apparently
intended to provide a readily available defendant to the injured shareholder
and at the same time to exonerate innocent officers and directors. If the
corporation suffers a loss at the suit of the shareholder, however, it should
obviously have the right to proceed against the officers and directors who were
at fault."' An alternative sanction might have been the imposition of a statu-
tory penalty, but the new law has tried to avoid this method of enforcing its
provisions. 112
105. American Institute of Certified Public Accountants, op. cit. supra note 89
(A.R.B. No. 43) at Ch. 1 (A). Cf. SEC Reg. S-X, Rule 5.02(35), 17 CFR § 210.5-02(35)
(Supp. 1961).
10. N.Y. Bus. Corp. Law § 517(1)(A):
The board of any corporation formed before the effective date of this chapter
may determine the amount of the corporation's earned surplus before the declara-
tion of the first dividend after the effective date of this chapter, and such de-
termination if made in good faith shall be conclusive ...
107. This last point would not seem to be new. A similar doubt can be raised under
the old law with respect to the amount of undifferentiated surplus.
108. N.Y. Bus. Corp. Law § 510(a)(2), to be renumbered § 510(c) by § 20 of the
omnibus bill.
109. N.Y. Bus. Corp. Law § 520.
110. N.Y. Legis. Doc. No. 12, Rev. Supp. 33 (1961).
111. Lawyers opposed to the disclosure requirement have proposed two alternatives
to emasculate its effectiveness: Permissive waiver in the certificate of incorporation, and
elimination of any liability for directors, even if they are at fault. Testimony at public
bearing in Albany, February 14, 1962.
112. Compare, e.g., N.Y. Stock Corp. Law § 10 with N.Y. Bus. Corp. Law § 624(a).
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The wasting assets provision-Aside from the disclosure requirement, the
other major novelty in the dividend law of the new statute is the limited
capital impairment permitted in the case of wasting assets corporations, broadly
defined.11 3 The limitations are: (1) that dividends in excess of surplus may
not exceed the portion of the cost of wasting assets that has been recovered
through depletion, amortization or sale; and (2) that the remaining net assets
at least equal the liquidation preferences of preferred shares. 11 4
III
Smum RIutcRHAsEs
The basic pattern of the Business Corporation Law on the subject of
share repurchases is similar to that of the Stock Corporation Law, although
modified in some details. The old and the new statutes follow generally the
same rules that are applicable to cash and property dividends, since in both
situations there is a distribution of corporate assets to shareholders.
Related questions are the accounting aspects of share reacquisitions and
the provisions governing options and contracts for repurchase of shares.
Fundamental rules-Subject to the equitable solvency limitation, a cor-
poration under the Business Corporation Law may repurchase its shares out
of any surplus and, in certain enumerated cases, out of capital. 11 5 If the
shares are repurchased out of capital, they must be cancelled."16 On the other
hand, if the shares are repurchased out of surplus, the directors as a rule
have the option of retaining them as treasury shares or of cancelling them at
the time of acquisition or at any time thereafter; the exceptions are con-
verted shares and any other shares required by the certificate of incorporation
to be cancelled upon reacquisition."17 Cancelled shares are restored to the
status of unissued shares; they need not be eliminated from authorized shares
unless their reissue is prohibited by the certificate of incorporation." 8
Disclosure-If there is a reduction of stated capital as a result of share
cancellations," 9 disclosure is required to be made to shareholders in the next
financial statement, or in any earlier dividend notice, or in any event within
six months. 120 This method of disclosure to shareholders takes the place of
113. The term includes corporations engaged in exploiting natural resources and
patents, or formed primarily for the liquidation of specific assets. N.Y. Bus. Corp. Law
§ 510(a) (1), to be renumbered § 510(b) by § 20 of the omnibus bill.
114. The first limitation is derived from Model Act § 40(b); the second from Del.
Code Ann. tit. 8, § 170 (1953).
115. N.Y. Bus. Corp. Law § 513. This follows generally the earlier law of New
York except for a new provision--elimination of fractions of shares out of stated capital.
116. N.Y. Bus. Corp. Law § 515(a).
117. N.Y. Bus. Corp. Law § 515(b) and parts of (a).
118. N.Y. Bus. Corp.-Law § 515(e). Cf. N.Y. Stock Corp. Law § 21, requiring
elimination from authorized shares in the case of dissenters' shares purchased out of capital.
119. No reduction of stated capital results from cancellation of' converted shares.
N.Y. Bus. Corp. Law § 519(e).
120. N.Y. Bus. Corp. Law § 515(d). The organized bar, which has consistently op-
posed the disclosure requirement, suggested that if disclosure is required for dividends
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the "statement of cancellation" required to be filed for public record under
the Model Act' 2 ' or the pseudo-"amendment" required by the Stock Cor-
poration Law for the same purpose.122 The present language of the new act,
however, does not adequately take care of the situation where redeemable
shares may be reacquired out of capital over a period of time and thus must
be cancelled every day as they are reacquired. The 1962 omnibus amending
bill will remedy this fault.'23
Accounting for share repurchases-In the absence of statutory directions,
express or implied, the usual question in accounting for share repurchases is
whether the distribution of corporate assets to the shareholder is analogous
to dividends or to (partial) liquidation.
The Business Corporation Law follows the dividend analogy for shares
purchased out of surplus which do not have to be cancelled upon reacquisi-
tion. There is a specific provision that the retention of reacquired shares as
treasury shares does not reduce stated capital. 2 4 Thus the assets spent for
reacquisition of treasury shares give rise to a reduction of surplus, as in the
case of assets distributed as dividends.
Again, as in the case of dividends, there is no statutory requirement that
the amount distributed be charged first to earned surplus, but the statute
favors compliance with orthodox accounting procedure in both instances. In
the case of dividends, no notice is required if the dividend comes out of
earned surplus. 25 In the case of share repurchases, if earned surplus has
been applied to the reacquisition, the corporation is permitted to restore to
earned surplus, out of the consideration received upon resale of the shares,
the amount so applied.' 26 The complicated procedure of "surplus restrictions"
for treasury shares thus becomes unnecessary.
127
On the other hand, when repurchased shares are to be cancelled upon
reacquisition, the Business Corporation Law provisions would permit ac-
counting for the reacquisition on the "contraction of capital" theory.128 Upon
cancellation of shares, the stated capital is "reduced by the amount of stated
capital represented by such shares, which may include the pro rata portion
paid out of other than earned surplus, a similar disclosure to shareholders should be
required whenever shares were repurchased. joint Report of Bar Ass'ns p. 121, § 5.20
The analogy does not hold, because there is no implied representation to the remaining
shareholders; the true parallel here is public disclosure of other reductions of stated
capital, conversion of shares and similar capital readjustments.
121. Model Act § 61.
122. N.Y. Stock Corp. Law §§ 29, 27(5), 28(2).
123. Omnibus bill § 24.
124. N.Y. Bus. Corp. Law § 515(c).
125. N.Y. Bus. Corp. Law § 510, discussed supra p. 467.
126. N.Y. Bus. Corp. Law § 517(a)(5). However, no restoration of earned surplus
can be made if the treasury shares are cancelled..The resulting surplus is capital surplus
under § 517(a)(3).
127. See de Capriles and McAniff, The Financial Provisions of the New (1961) New
York Business Corporation Law, 36 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 1239, 1261 (1961).
128. See American Accounting Ass'n, Accounting and Reporting Standards for Cor-
porate Financial Statements 7 (1957).
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of any surplus that may have been transferred to stated capital and not al-
located to any designated class or series of shares."12 Since there is no re-
quirement that the excess of cost over stated capital be deducted entirely
from earned surplus, it is permissible upon cancellation to reduce capital sur-
plus by the amount allocable to the cancelled shares. The analogy to partial
liquidation is especially persuasive in the case of the repurchase of redeem-
able shares out of stated capital.'3 0
Options and contracts to repurchase-The Business Corporation Law
develops more fully than does the Stock Corporation law the subject of re-
deemable shares, 31 including a provision for redeemable common shares if at
the time of issue and redemption there is another class of common shares not
subject to redemption.' 32 The new statute makes it clear that redeemable
shares are ordinarily "callable" shareg, since the option to redeem belongs to
the corporation.'3 3 With one exception, corporations may not issue shares
which.purport to give the holder the option to compel redemption by the cor-
poration. 34 The rationale of the rule appears to be that such securities, if
compulsory redemption is enforceable, 3 5 are really a type of bond and
should be labeled as such. An exception is made only for shares of open-end
investment companies subject to federal regulation.136
It follows that in ordinary corporations a shareholder may obtain the
right to compel the corporation to buy his shares, within the limits permitted
by the solvency and surplus rules, only by contract. The Business Corpora-
tion Law has given statutory recognition to agreements for purchase by a cor-
poration of its own shares'm and, in doing so, has removed the doubts cast
by the Topken case 3 8 on the availability of the remedy of specific perform-
ance.
Two final points should be mentioned: (1) There is a protective pro-
vision for holders of redeemable shares in that the corporation may not pay
more than the redemption when it buys redeemable shares (other than upon
a call for redemption) during the period of redeemability. 139 (2) Since re-
acquired shares may be cancelled by the directors without shareholder ap-
proval, and the resulting surplus is available for additional share repurchases,
129. N.Y. Bus. Corp. Law § 515(d).
130. The reason for permitting repurchase of redeemable share out of capital is
that such shares are deemed to be temporary by the terms of their creation.
131. N.Y. Legis. Doc. No. 12, App. C, 62 (1961).
132. N.Y. Bus. Corp. Law § 512(c).
133. N.Y. Bus. Corp. Law § 512(a).
134. N.Y. Bus. Corp. Law § 512(b).
135. In the absence of specific statutory authority, compulsory redemption is prob-
ably not enforceable. See Dewing, Financial Policy of Corporations 154, n. aaa (5th ed.
1953).
136. N.Y. Bus. Corp. Law § 512(b).
137. N.Y. Bus. Corp. Law § 514. The text of this section is revised by § 24 of the
omnibus amending bill.
138. Topken, Loring & Schwartz, Inc. v. Schwartz, 249 N.Y. 206, 163 N.E. 735
(1928).
139. N.Y. Bus. Corp. Law § 513(c).
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it is possible for a corporation that has enough surplus to buy back one of its
shares to repurchase as many shares as its financial resources will permit
under the equitable solvency limitation.140
IV
SHARE DISTRIBUTIONS AND RECLASSIFICATIONS
The Business Corporation Law141 codifies the case law governing stock
dividends, stock splits, and related corporate action, with a few variations
and additions. Since these transactions do not involve disbursements of assets,
they cannot threaten corporate solvency; but they normally affect one or
more of the accounts reflecting the ownership interest in the corporation and
thus may give rise to problems of appropriate disclosure to the shareholders.
The new act contains an anti-dilution -provision,"' and another authorizing
share distributions upon treasury shares; 143 neither is to be found in the
existing precedents.
Stock dividends and splits-The Business Corporation Law deliberately
avoids use of the term "stock dividend" because of the "conflict between the
trust cases and the views of the financial community."'144 The traditional case
law tends to classify a share distribution to shareholders as a stock dividend
if there is a transfer from surplus to stated capital equal to the par value of
the shares distributed. The term stock split is limited to situations in which
additional shares are created without any effect on the surplus or stated capital
accounts; all that happens is that the same stated capital is represented by a
larger number of shares due to a proportionate decrease in the par or stated
value of each share. The financial community, on the other hand, often speaks
of a "stock split effected in the form of a stock dividend,"' 45 which would
be unintelligibly confusing under traditional legal distinctions.
The case law developed in a period when most "surplus" represented
accumulated earnings and "par value" was a reasonable approximation of
the capital investment represented by each share. Thus "stock dividends"
were in substance a capitalization of earnings with the same effect as if a
cash dividend had been paid and the shareholder had reinvested the dividend
in additional shares. This is still the popular conception of stock dividends. 140
The source of modem confusion is again the widespread practice of
issuing shares at nominal par or stated values far below the amount of invest-
140. Quaere, whether in an action for specific performance a corporation could be
compelled to cancel reacquired shares to produce surplus out of which to buy shares
within the solvency limitation.
141. N.Y. Bus. Corp. Law § 511. "This section is new to the statutory law of New
York, but in large part codifies existing case law." N.Y. Legis. Doc. No. 12, Rev. Supp.
29 (1961).
142. N.Y. Bus. Corp. Law § 511(a)(3).
143. N.Y. Bus. Corp. Law § 511(b).
144. N.Y. Legis. Doc. No. 12, Rev. Supp. 20 (1961).
145. N.Y. Stock Exchange, Company Manual, § A-14, p. A-257 (1959).
146. Id. at § A-13, p. A-235 (1955).
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ment they represent, so that it becomes imperative to make a distinction be-
tween the "capital surplus" so created and the surplus that represents ac-
cumulated earnings. The old-fashioned "stock dividend," in the context of
modem finance, must a fortiori involve a transfer out of earned surplus of an
amount equal to the fair or market value of the shares, an amount normally
far in excess of the par or stated value of the shares. The excess goes into
"capital surplus," which from the financial viewpoint is invested capital, akin
to stated capital and not to earned surplus. If a share distributed to share-
holders is supported by the transfer of only the nominal par or stated value
from earned surplus to stated capital, or if the transfer is made from capital
surplus to stated capital, the effect is for most purposes similar to that of the
traditional stock split-substantially the same amount of invested capital
broken up into a larger number of shares. 14r
These modem developments are further complicated by the growing prac-
tice of using treasury shares for these distributions. Technically under the
case law it is not essential to make any transfer from surplus to stated capital
because the treasury shares are already part of the stated capital. The nature
of the distribution then depends on whether an appropriate transfer is made
from earned surplus to capital surplus.
The Business Corporation Law of course permits accounting for true
stock dividends in accordance with preferred professional practice 48 but does
not attempt to compel such accounting. It does specify that the consideration
for the issue of new shares is the transfer of surplus (of either kind) to stated
capital; 149 but this provision only corrects an ancient inconsistency between
the letter of the statute and long-accepted practice. 50 As in the case of cash
dividends, the new act relies upon hppropriate disclosure as a technique to
avoid misleading the shareholders concerning the nature of a particular cor-
porate action.
Disclosure-The basic reason for requiring disclosure is the popular con-
ception of the "stock dividend" as a "distribution" of earnings which have
been automatically reinvested in the shares received by the shareholder. If
the shares distributed in effect constitute a stock split from the financial view-
point, there is an element of harmful deception, even if there has been a
transfer from surplus to stated capital for the nominal par or stated value of
such shares.' 5 '
147. Cf. American Institute of Certified Public Accountants, op. cit. supra note 89
(A.R.B. No. 43) at 51-53 (1953).
148. Cf. N.Y. Bus. Corp. Law § 511(e):
Nothing in this section shall prevent a corporation from making supplementary
transfers from earned surplus to stated capital or capital surplus in connection
with share distributions or reclassifications.
149. N.Y. Bus. Corp. Law § 504(f).
150. Cf. N.Y. Stock Corp. Law § 69, which does not expressly recognize transfers
of surplus as consideration for shares; the case law has done so since Williams v. Western
Union Tel. Co., 93 N.Y. 162 (1883).
151. N.Y. Legis. Doc. No. 12, App. C, 63 (1961).
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An earlier version of the Business Corporation Law'52 was drafted
around the idea that the label "stock dividend" should be prohibited except
for share distributions that were supported by a transfer out of earned surplus
of an amount equal to ,the fair or market value of the shares. For a variety of
reasons, including the possibility of unpredictable repercussions in the law of
trusts and of conflict with one section with the Personal Property Law,153 the
proposal was dropped from subsequent drafts.
The statute now requires that every distribution of shares to shareholders
shall be accompanied by a statement of the effect of such distribution upon
the stated capital, earned surplus and capital surplus of the corporation.154
The shareholder is expected to draw his own conclusions.
This pattern of disclosure is similar to the notice required to accompany
dividends made from sources other than earned surplus. There seems to be an
omission in the disclosure machinery, however, with respect to stock splits
and reclassifications or combinations of shares, which may not involve share
distributions, and yet may have a direct effect upon the ownership accounts
of the corporation similar to that involved in share cancellations and con-
versions.155
Other new provisions-A final word should be said about the two new
provisions in this area of the law. The anti-dilution section specifies that share
distributions may be made only to holders of the same class or series of
shares unless the certificate of incorporation permits distribution to holders
of another class, or unless consent is obtained from the holders of a majority
of the outstanding shares of the class or series to be distributed.1 50
The section authorizing a corporation, upon distribution of unissued
shares to the holders of any class of outstanding shares, to make at its option
an equivalent distribution upon treasury shares of the same class,'57 is said
to be valuable when treasury shares are being held to meet outstanding
options or conversion privileges.
CONCLUSION
From the foregoing analysis it will be evident that the disclosure re-
quirements in the financial provisions of the Business Corporation Law have
elicited the greatest difference of opinion. For critics who favor stricter regu-
lation of corporate management, the disclosure provisions appear too per-
missive; they will not prevent corporate action that may be harmful to share-
152. Proposed N.Y. Bus. Corp. Law, Senate Int. 3124, Senate Pr. 3316, 183d Sess.
(1960).
153. N.Y. Pers. Prop. Law § 17-a.
154. N.Y. Bus. Corp. Law § 511(f).
155. Section 21 of the omnibus bill will correct this omission by adding a new sec-
tion (g) to N.Y. Bus. Corp. Law § 511.
156. N.Y. Bus. Corp. Law § 511(a)(3).
157. N.Y. Bus. Corp. Law § 511(b).
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holders or creditors. 158 For critics who regard shareholders as mere con-
tributors of capital funds not interested in the technical nature of dividends,
share distributions, and similar matters, the disclosure provisions appear to
impose an indefensible burden upon corporate management. 159
The preceding discussion will also make it clear that I personally believe
the disclosure provisions have a rational basis addressed to the solution of
well-defined problems with a minimum of prohibitions. Accordingly, it is
desirable to summarize in proper perspective the various disclosure situations
and the type of burden that they impose upon corporate management.
(1) Management is required to send a notice to the shareholders accom-
panying any dividend paid from sources other than earned surplus. For the
reasons previously given, there is no real technical problem in determining
the amount of earned surplus. Thus, the giving of notice involves only an
appropriate statement on a slip of paper accompanying the dividend check;
or perhaps a statement on the check itself. Even this can be avoided if the
directors decide to pay dividends out of earned surplus only-which as a
rule is not a bad idea.
(2) Management is also required to send a notice accompanying any
share distribution to shareholders. Again, this is not technically difficult or
burdensome. Some explanation usually accompanies the certificate for the
new shares, and all that is involved in complying with the disclosure require-
ment is some attention to the content of that explanation. The frequency
with which this is needed depends upon how often a corporation makes share
distributions to its shareholders. Most of the middle-sized and small corpora-
tions do so only at rare intervals.
(3) Management is also required to give notice (directly to shareholders,
rather than by public filing) of reductions of capital, share conversions, and
eliminations of deficits in the earned surplus accounts in the next financial
statement, or -in any earlier dividend or share distribution notice, and in any
event within six months. None of these corporate operations occur with any
frequency. Special arrangements for notifying shareholders need be made only
if there is no communication with shareholders for a period of six months
after what is a most unusual occurrence in the life of the corporation.
Naturally one cannot insist that a corporation pay dividends or make
share distributions at frequent intervals. But every corporation can readily
make (and perhaps should make) periodic financial reports to its share-
holders, which will ordinarily eliminate the need for separate communications
to shareholders with respect to these extraordinary events. If the existence of
these disclosure requirements will promote regular, perhaps quarterly, finan-
cial statements to shareholders, which are not presently required by the new
158. See Kessler, The New York Business Corporation Law, 36 St. John's L. R~ev.
1, 33-34 (1961).
159. Testimony of Mr. Sinclair Hatch at public hearing in Albany, February 14,
1962.
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act, 160 I would regard this as a bonus and a definite "plus" factor in the total
evaluation of the financial provisions of the Business Corporation Law.
However, regular financial statements alone, without the specific in-
formation required to be disclosed under the Business Corporation Law, do
not by themselves offer a satisfactory substitute for the disclosure provisions.
Even if each successive statement contained a breakdown of earned and
capital surplus, the amount of the changes would not be readily determinable
without comparative figures, and an understanding of the changes by most
shareholders would require explanation in a manner approximating that im-
plied in the disclosure provisions.
In summary, it seems to me that the financial provisions of the Business
Corporation Law do not unduly interfere with the freedom of management to
manage. They do, however, insist that this be a responsible freedom, with
periodic disclosure to shareholders; and this, I believe, is a reasonable and
desirable feature of a modern corporation law.
161
160. The present text in effect requires a corporation to furnish financial statements
to a shareholder only if such statements have already been distributed to other share-
holders or made available to the public. N.Y. Bus. Corp. Law § 624(e). The omnibus
bill Section 41 requires financial statements to be furnished upon request to holders of
five per cent or more of any class of outstanding shares, or to any person who has been
a shareholder for six months.
161. Regardless of the merits of the celebrated Berie-Dodd controversy [Dodd, For
Whom Are Corporate Managers Trustees?, 45 Harv. L. Rev. 1145 (1938); Berle, For
Whom Corporate Managers Are Trustees: A Note, 45 Harv. L. Rev. 1365 (1938)], it
should be evident that, in the present state of our law, effective accountability of man-
agement to shareholders for the administration of economic enterprises is the only prac-
tical alternative to ultimate bureaucratic control.
